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Abstract
In 2007, the German party Die Linke emerged as the result of the PDS (Party of
Democratic Socialism; the successor of the Communist Party) merging with the
WASG (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit; a break away left wing of the
Social Democrats). This article compares the policy position of Die Linke with the posi-
tions of the two merging partners. Using a recently developed computerized method,
Wordscores, we investigate the differences between the merging partners and compare
their policy positions with the position of Die Linke. We provide a systematic analysis
of the parties’ positions with respect to the economic policy issue based on the manifes-
tos of the three parties. The word scores estimates reveal significant differences
between the two merging partners and show that Die Linke is positioned closer to the
PDS with respect to the economic issue.
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Introduction
Recent German regional (Bundesla¨nder) elections (in Lower Saxony, Hessen and
Hamburg, among other places) have produced what many regard as a surprising result:
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the success of the new leftist party Die Linke. This party was the result of a merging of
the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism; the successor to the Communist Party, SED
[Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands]) and the WASG (Wahlalternative Arbeit
und Soziale Gerechtigkeit – a break away movement of the Social Democratic Party,
SPD). Despite its electoral success in both Western and Eastern Bundesla¨nder, the party
is facing several challenges. Joining forces with a political ‘opponent’ and partner
involves the need to build a new party structure, write new statutes, develop a new party
programme, and much more. This case study focuses on the ideological challenge Die
Linke is facing after its merger. Die Linke has to develop a programmatic and ideologi-
cal profile with which both merging partners (and their potential voters) can identify. In
particular, the aim of the paper is to investigate the position of Die Linke with respect to
its central policy issue (economy) and compare the party’s position with that of its mer-
ging partners. Using a new technique for the computerized analysis of political texts
(Laver et al., 2003), we investigate the extent to which the ideology of Die Linke is a
continuation of the ideas of the PDS or the result of a balanced compromise between the
two merging partners.
This case study offers an interesting opportunity to examine the ‘ideological’ merging
of parties, since Die Linke is the result of a merger of two very different parties with
respect to their political culture and ideological history (Patton, 2006). The PDS was the
successor of the communist SED and had a long history. The party’s profile and identity
had always been strongly focused around old left topics such as employment, the econ-
omy and job security (Markovits and Silvia, 1997). In contrast, the WASG was launched
as a protest movement in 2005. It opposed Schro¨der’s economic and labour market
reforms and was a melting pot of, among others, unionists, disaffected SPD members
as well as tiny communist groups and radical green leftists with a weak common ideol-
ogy (Poguntke, 2005; Proksch and Slapin, 2006).
We present our study in four steps. In the next section we outline our case: the merger
of WASG and PDS into Die Linke. We then introduce some ideas about the ideological
challenge merging partners face and introduce our main hypothesis. Next, we present
our methodology and data. Our empirical analysis is presented in the third section.
We conclude with a brief summary and some suggestions for further research.
Die Linke
When the electoral alliance DIE LINKSPARTEI.PDS – composed of the two leftist
parties PDS and WASG – gained 8.7 percent of the vote in the pre-scheduled federal
elections of 2005, it caught the political establishment quite by surprise. The immediate
success of this left alliance at the polls was impressive, and was preceded and accompa-
nied by criticism and protest from its respective members (Augstein, 2005; Scharenberg,
2006; Seils, 2007). Within the WASG, established in 2005, a question raised was
whether the resourceful and politically more experienced PDS would not just structurally
and programmatically sublimate the much smaller WASG (Pohr, 2006). The PDS, in
turn, was afraid that theWASGwould gain too much influence in the programme debate,
owing to its valuable voter potential in the Western Bundesla¨nder and the value of its
popular leader Oskar Lafontaine (Seils, 2007). Furthermore, the fear of ideological
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vagueness was fuelled by the substantial differences with regard to the parties’ program-
matic contents (Micus, 2007: 194); some pragmatists of the PDS feared that ‘greater
ideological diversity would lead to a loss of Politikfa¨higkeit’ (Hough et al., 2007:
141). A further complicating factor was the fact that the WASG was strategically
oriented towards an oppositional role, whereas the dominant wing within the PDS stra-
tegically opted for political change through political cooperation (Scharenberg, 2006).
Ideological differences, as well as a huge divide in their respective primary party goals,
structural resources and electorate, were all brought into the negotiations for the merger.
The significant divergences between the parties resulted in difficult negotiations when
setting up the merger, which can be seen in the fact that the debate on the development
of a programmatic and strategic profile is not yet finished, although certain trends in
ideological and programmatic choices can be seen. In addition, each party had serene
problems that made it important for both parties to broaden electoral gains if they were
to become relevant actors in the German party system.
The PDS was the successor party of the authoritarian SED (Sozialistische Einheit-
spartei Deutschlands) and therefore a small but established actor in the German party
system (Hartleb and Rode, 2006: 12). It had a well-defined and continuous identity as
the party of anti-capitalism moving – more recently – towards ‘democratic socialism’
(see PDS, 2003) and in its claim to be the sole deputy of genuine Eastern Bundesla¨nder
interests in the German political system. Because of its roots, the PDS had ample
resources at its disposal. Among them were a very dense local and regional infrastructure
– which it had inherited from the SED – and a large number of party members, partic-
ularly in the Eastern part of Germany.1 The PDS also had some governmental and policy
experience at the Bundesla¨nder level and at the local level in the Eastern Bundesla¨nder.
It tolerated a minority government in Saxony–Anhalt from 1994 to 2002 and was part of
a government coalition in Mecklenburg–West Pomerania (1998–2006) and Berlin (since
2001). Despite these regional successes, the PDS faced serious problems in the course of
establishing itself as a relevant oppositional party at the national level, and was reduced
to two seats in the 2002 national elections. It is obvious from Figure 1 that the PDS’s
electoral success was largely limited to the Eastern German Bundesla¨nder. Indeed, the
party had sufficient strength in the East to retain Bundestag representation, yet was never
able to break through in the West. Also, where it was widely regarded as a legitimate
expression of Eastern interests in the Eastern Bundesla¨nder, it was always considered
as a political outsider in Western Germany. The party’s substantial electorate in Eastern
Germany, but the lack of it in Western Germany, confined the party to the status of a
‘regional pressure group’ (Kitschelt, 2003: 135). The PDS was not able to expand its
political infrastructure to the Western parts of Germany or enhance its membership in
these parts (Moreau, 2002: 60). Besides, the party had a disproportionately high number
of older members.2
The WASG, in turn, was established as an opposition movement to the reform pro-
gramme Agenda 2010 of the SPD, which was intended to modernize the German welfare
state by restricting entitlements, deregulating labour markets and restructuring pensions
and healthcare. It represented itself as a modern left movement in defence of the welfare
state and had among its members the charismatic Oskar Lafontaine, former SPD Finance
Minister and national party chairman. In 2005, the first moves towards the foundation
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of a left-wing protest party were undertaken and in July the Alternative List for
Employment and Social Justice (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit
[WASG]) was launched (Poguntke, 2005). The WASG was a melting pot of people with
very different backgrounds and was unable to build a coherent political identity. In fact,
it did not strive for one because it perceived itself as a heterogeneous collective move-
ment (see WASG, 2005), comprising disappointed former SPD members, unionists as
well as left intellectuals (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007: 55). These different protagonists
were united by the common political goal to achieve ‘social justice’ (see WASG,
2005). The rather loosely structured local and regional infrastructure of the WASG was
mainly situated in the former Western parts of Germany, where it could count on support
from within the trade union movement, which is traditionally allied to the Social Dem-
ocrats (Poguntke, 2005). Hence, it had an important electoral basis.
It is clear that both the WASG and the PDS faced major (electoral) challenges at the
national level, as the electoral basis of each party was located in only one part of
Germany – the PDS in the Eastern Bundesla¨nder, theWASG in theWestern Bundesla¨nder.
Furthermore, the WASG lacked financial as well as infrastructural resources for national
elections (Pohr, 2006). Finally, the PDS was afraid that it would render trifling at the
national level after its debacle at the 2002 federal elections.
These structural problems became virulent when the then chancellor Schroe¨der sur-
prisingly called for pre-scheduled national elections in May 2005. Suddenly, two parties
that were programmatically positioned left of the SPD competed for the national elec-
tions. In the same month, neither party had passed the 5 percent hurdle in the Bundes-

































Figure 1. Electoral results of the PDS (1990–2002) and DIE LINKSPARTEI.PDS (2005) in federal
elections (percentages of valid votes – Zweitstimme) in Western and Eastern Germany
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These disappointing results forced the WASG and PDS leaders to consider an electoral
alliance for the upcoming elections. They also considered an alliance to be a ‘historic
chance’ to establish a party left of the SPD (Scharenberg, 2006: 517). Shortly after
Schro¨der’s announcement, the party board members of both parties met and discussed
the options of a left electoral alliance. Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi, two outstand-
ing leading figures of, respectively, the WASG and PDS, declared that they would take
up the leading position of this alliance (Micus, 2007: 191). The alliance formation was
thus mainly an elite-driven process acted out by leading politicians of both parties and
catalysed by the pre-scheduled elections (Lorenz, 2007; Micus, 2007). Its main goal was
vote-seeking and the establishment of a relevant left party. To form the alliance, the PDS
renamed itself DIE LINKSPARTEI.PDS in June 2005 and offered list places to WASG
members who participated under the umbrella of DIE LINKSPARTEI. The common
programmatic core was the call for ‘social justice’.
The promising outcome of 8.7 percent of votes in the national elections of 2005
pointed the way ahead for the merger of the two parties into one united party. Albeit, the
fusion was not undisputed; it was supported by a majority of both parties’ members and
each step of the merger was confirmed at respective party congresses. A steering com-
mission was set up to prepare the infrastructural, financial and programmatic merger
(Bartsch, 2007: 2). At the same time, different working groups responsible for infrastruc-
ture, finances and the ideological programme, respectively, were set up – all composed
in a parity way – to work out the merger process. In December 2006 the chairs of both
parties decided on the first common founding documents for the merger, among them the
‘Founding Programme’ (Gru¨ndungsprogramm), which was regarded by most political
analysts as a first minimal compromise (Formelkompromiss) (Scharenberg, 2008). From
March until May 2007, delegates of both parties voted and confirmed the merger in sev-
eral steps, with 82.6 percent (PDS) and 83.9 percent (WASG) at respective ballots.
In sum, the final merging of both parties in 2007 could have been described as a
‘rational marriage’ driven mainly for electoral reasons, promoted by respective structural
problems and catalysed by the pre-scheduled national elections in 2005. Only united as
an electoral alliance first, later as one party, they hoped to overcome the 5 percent hurdle
at the Bundesla¨nder and at the national level.
Ideological challenges in merger integration
Whereas the ‘merger between two or more parties under a new political label is an
exceptional event’ (Be´langer and Godbout, 2004: 1; Mair, 1990), there is a continuing
trend of merging between commercial firms. A fusion of two or more organizations is
indeed a frequently used practice towards achieving growth in commercial environ-
ments. Yet, various surveys have indicated that most mergers fail because cultural
clashes, confusion and internal disruptions, with dramatic declines in employee and cus-
tomer satisfaction, all lead to significant declines in profitability (Epstein, 2004). There
are indeed significant challenges in the integration of both technical and human aspects
when two companies are brought together, i.e. often causing a power struggle as mem-
bers of both companies seek control over the new organization (Epstein, 2004: 175).
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Even though mergers allow organizations to attain goals they might not have been
able to attain alone, they can be risky and definitely include different challenges for the
composing partners. Merging partners have to decide on how to divide tasks between
them and they need to build a new organizational structure, define common goals, set
up new accounting procedures, and so on. In particular, the implementation of a new
shared corporate culture, or for political parties a political identity, remains a complex
and difficult process. Therefore, with respect to the merging of political parties, the
development of a joint party programme is a particular issue since the programme is a
main source of identification for members (Klingemann, 1989). This is also argued by
Micus (2007), who points out that party manifestos are of fundamental importance for
the self-perception of the party, and for the integration and linkage of party members
to their party. Thus, Micus (2007) argues, party programmes mainly have an internal
effect. Following this argumentation in a party merger, the creation of a united and cohe-
sive party manifesto can be viewed as one of the major challenges. The reason lies in the
above-mentioned importance of the party programme to internal integration and, as the
former parties have a distinctive history, in the impossibility of starting the party anew
from scratch. If the merger is not to be a takeover of members or absorption of the other
party, the new programme must be designed in a way that does not repel the respective
former members and voters, and should include the major ideological ideas of the differ-
ent partners. This might result in a struggle for influence on major programmatic points,
especially when the merger cannot, in management terms, be considered a ‘merger of
equals’ (Rock et al., 1987: 360). This inequality was the case with the merging of the
PDS and WASG, because the PDS had many more resources at its disposal.
With respect to the case of Die Linke, it seems therefore reasonable to assume that the
PDS would shape the new programme more than would theWASG, as the PDS had more
experience in the political system; at least in its outward presentation it was more (ideo-
logically) coherent and had a more homogeneous membership, dominated by the refor-
mist wing and therefore a fairly stable identity compared to the WASG. In our empirical
analysis, the programme of Die Linke would then be much of a continuation of the PDS
party programme. Thus, we assume that in a cluster plot of policy positions the pro-
gramme of Die Linke will be positioned closer to the party programme of the PDS than
to that of the WASG.
Method
In order to answer our research question and to test the policy positions of the merging
partners (WASG and PDS) and the newly formed party (Die Linke), we used the Word-
scores technique developed by Laver et al. (2003). This estimates the unknown position
of a set of virgin texts under investigation for one or more policy dimensions, stating
these positions in relation to the known (or assumed) position of a particular set of ref-
erence texts.3 The positions of reference texts are assigned by the researcher and are
based on information such as expert surveys, party manifesto data or mass survey data.
Essentially, Wordscores treats words as ‘data’ based on the assumption that the rela-
tive frequencies of the use of specific words by political actors manifest underlying polit-
ical positions. For a particular policy position, a numerical score is generated for each
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word and a vector of word scores is calculated based on the relative frequencies of all
words in the word universe of the reference texts. The vector of word scores for any a
priori policy dimension is thus a function of the policy positions and the patterns of rela-
tive word frequencies in the set of reference texts. Using the derived matrix of word
scores, it is then possible to study virgin texts with unknown policy positions. Basically,
each word score in a virgin text gives a small amount of information about which of the
reference texts the virgin text is most like, producing a conditional expectation of the
virgin text’s policy position. Each scored word in virgin texts adds to this information.
Once mean estimates of the policy positions of virgin texts have been calculated, the
Wordscores program computes a standard error for each estimation. Through calculating
a 95 percent confidence interval (mean raw score+1.96 standard errors), it is possible to
judge whether a difference between estimated policy positions of two texts is significant
(Laver et al., 2003: 317).
Finally, the Wordscores program provides a transformation of the so-called raw
scores (calculated as presented above). While preserving the mean and relative positions
of the virgin scores, their variance is set equal to that of the reference texts (Laver et al.,
2003: 316), putting the scores of the virgin and reference texts on the same metric. This
transformation enables comparison of the policy positions of the virgin and reference
texts.
The validity and reliability of the Wordscores technique for estimating party policy
positions has been shown in previous research (e.g. Klemmensen et al., 2007; Kritzinger
et al., 2004; Laver et al., 2006), but has also been the subject of vivid scientific discussion
(Benoit and Laver, 2007, 2008; Budge and Pennings, 2007a, 2007b; Martin and Van-
berg, 2008). Budge and Pennings (2007a, 2007b) recognize the usefulness of the method,
but are particularly concerned about the pairwise comparison (estimating policy posi-
tions on the basis of previous texts and findings); they argue that the program flattens
out party movement, as previous computerized approaches have done. However, Klem-
mensen et al. (2007) demonstrate reasonably good performance when systematically
comparing the Wordscores approach with expert data and the Comparative Manifesto
Project. Martin and Vanberg (2008) criticized the transformation procedure for short-
comings which, as they argue, distort the metric on which scores are placed and is sen-
sitive to the texts that are scored. They propose a more ‘robust’ transformation method
that avoids both shortcomings and that is also recommended by Benoit and Laver (2008)
when very few virgin texts are being used. Given that we only use three virgin texts in
our analysis (see below), we decided to use the transformation method of Martin and
Vanberg (2008) in our analysis presented below.4 Yet, given that the main focus of our
study is on comparing between the policy positions of the virgin texts we introduce (i.e.
the programmes of the WASG, PDS and Die Linke), we rely mostly on the raw scores.
These scores do not have the problems that occur when re-scaling raw Wordscores esti-
mates and are informative in answering our research question.
Analysis
The virgin texts of our analysis are the programmes of the merging partners (PDS and
WASG) and the newly formed party Die Linke. For the PDS, we consider the
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programme that was published in September 2003. The text (Grundsatzprogramm) was
written after the disappointing 2002 Bundestag elections and was considered the begin-
ning of a new era in which the PDS no longer contested a social market economy.5
Regarding the WASG, we examine their 2005 founding programme. For Die Linke,
we considered their Eckpunkte programme, which was published in (Die Linke,
2007). This Key Points programme is a preliminary party programme reflecting a min-
imal first compromise between the two composing partners and is generally not consid-
ered as consolidated (Lang, 2008: 39). However, this Eckpunkte programme was the
programme for the 2009 federal election campaign. Hence, the Eckpunkte programme
may be considered as the way the party currently represents itself to both its members
and the general electorate, and as such may reflect trends of programmatic choices and
relations of power in that respect. As reference texts from which to calculate the scores of
words in the virgin texts on the policy dimensions, we use the party manifestos of the
2002 elections of the main German parties (FDP, PDS, SPD, BU¨NDNIS 90/DIE GRU¨-
NEN and CDU/CSU).
The descriptive statistics for the manifestos presented in Table 1 illustrate that all
reference texts are relatively long documents containing between 14,000 and 27,000
words and using between 3,500 and 6,500 unique words. Given that ‘the content of the
virgin texts is analyzed in the context of the word universe of the reference texts’ (Laver
et al., 2003: 315), the number of words of the reference texts is crucial when applying the
Wordscores approach. The virgin texts are comparable in length to the reference texts
and are between 9,000 and 18,300 words in length. The programme of the PDS is longer
than the WASG programme, which mirrors the PDS’s longer history as well as its expe-
rience in formulating policy and in governing (Hough et al., 2007: 142). The programme
of Die Linke is the least detailed. As mentioned before, the aim of Die Linke’s Eck-
punckte programme was to reflect the minimum policy compromise between the WASG
and the PDS, but also served as the 2009 election programme. The percentages of score-
able virgin words are 88.1 for the PDS 2003 manifesto (16,105/18,281), 90.1 for the
WASG 2005 manifesto (10,174/11,286) and 89.6 for the Die Linke (2007) manifesto
(8,015/8,942). In other words, a large majority of the words used in the virgin texts are
also utilized in the reference texts.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for manifestos
Total words Unique words Words scored
Reference texts
PDS 2002 14,074 4,138
BU¨NDNIS 90/DIE GRU¨NEN 2002 14,322 3,670
SPD 2002 20,922 4,886
FDP 2002 26,765 6,499
CDU/CSU 2002 20,245 5,195
Virgin texts
PDS 2003 18,281 4,648 16,105
WASG 2005 11,286 3,271 10,174
DIE LINKE 2007 8,942 2,773 8,015
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To establish the position of the reference texts, we used the results from the expert
survey conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006). We considered the left–right dimension
of economic policy, as this is a main issue in German politics in general and the parties
under consideration (Benoit and Laver, 2006). This economic dimension is represented
by the ‘tax versus spending increases’ distinction, varying between maximal redistribu-
tion and services (score 1) and maximal economic libertarianism (score 20).
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 2, which shows the expert assigned
reference scores and the word scores estimates in both ‘raw’ form and ‘transformed’
form. The raw scores are particularly useful when drawing conclusions about the relative
positions of the virgin texts and are thus of particular interest in relation to our research
question. The transformed scores allow comparison of virgin text scores with the refer-
ence values (i.e. the 20-point expert scale).
The raw score results show that the policy positions on the economic dimension of the
two merging partners (PDS and WASG) are different. Also the confidence intervals
show that this difference is substantial and not the result of mere uncertainty in the esti-
mate.6 Hence, we can conclude that – before merging – the parties differed significantly
from one another with respect to their economic position. The PDS was clearly more left-
ist than the WASG. In other words, the WASG was more in favour of cutting public ser-
vices in order to be able to cut taxes than was the PDS. This raises the question about
which economic position the newly formed party, Die Linke, took. Did Die Linke posi-
tion itself between the two merging partners, or was the party’s economic policy rather a
continuation of one of the partner’s economic policy? The Wordscores estimates show a
significant difference with respect to the economic policy between Die Linke and the
WASG. The merged party is positioned to the left of the WASG. At the same time, the
results reveal that the economic position of Die Linke is not significantly different from
the PDS. Hence, in line with our expectations, Die Linke seems – at least with respect to
the core tenet of the PDS’s policy agenda (i.e. the economic issue) – more a continuation
of the PDS than a balanced compromise between two merging partners.











PDS 2002 3.0 (0.19) 9.53 (0.02) 9.49–9.57 3.00
BU¨NDNIS 90/ DIE
GRU¨NEN 2002
11.0 (0.35) 11.14 (0.01) 11.12–11.16 10.68
SPD 2002 9.3 (0.37) 11.01 (0.01) 10.99–11.03 10.06
FDP 2002 18.7 (0.14) 12.82 (0.02) 12.78–12.86 18.70
CDU/CSU 2002 14.4 (0.26) 11.90 (0.01) 11.88–11.92 14.31
Virgin texts
PDS 2003 10.82 (0.02) 10.78–10.86 9.16
WASG 2005 11.14 (0.02) 11.10–11.18 10.68
DIE LINKE 2007 10.89 (0.03) 10.83–10.95 9.49
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Before turning to the conclusion, it is interesting to compare the positions of the
merging partners with those of the main German parties. Score transformation was
applied to compare the position of reference texts with those of virgin texts. The trans-
formed economic position of the WASG in 2005 is more rightist than the transformed
score of the SPD 2002 party programme based on the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert
survey. At first sight, this is unexpected, since the WASG movement split from the SPD
because of its disagreement with the SPD’s ‘rightist’ policy ideas and Schro¨der’s Agenda
2010. The main focus of the discourse of the WASG was indeed its opposition to Schro¨-
der’s economic and labour market reforms (Proksch and Slapin, 2006), and therefore the
WASG was expected to be found to the left of the SPD. However, the 2002 SPD man-
ifesto did not state anything about the labour market reforms introduced only a year later.
In line with this argument is the finding that the WASG 2005 manifesto is more in favour
of raising taxes to increase public services than the SPD 2005 manifesto (with a trans-
formed score of 11.02; not presented in the table), being the result of a rightwards move
of the SPD between 2002 and 2005. The transformed results also reveal a remarkable
move rightwards of the PDS between 2002 and 2003, confirming the idea behind the
PDS’s programmatic shift towards the reformist/realist wing. Indeed, after its electoral
defeat in 2002, the party introduced the social market economy in its 2003 programme
and dissociated itself from the former SED and its communism. The party distanced
itself from revolution and historical determinism, ‘while acknowledging that entrepre-
neurial activity and the profit motive [were] important preconditions for innovation and
economic productivity’ (Patton, 2006: 217). The 2003 programme postulated a huge
shift in the ideological/programmatic profile of the party as the reformist/realist wing
asserted itself against the traditionalist/fundamentalist wing of the party (Gapper,
2003). The party learned from its defeat in 2002 that it had to intensify the expansion
of its electoral base and modernize its programme to acquire a modern, left-socialist pro-
file and to become a viable left-socialist alternative attractive to voters (Patton, 2006).
The disastrous election results indeed showed the need to address questions of program-
matic renewal, more pragmatic and flexible planning and government participation
within the party; a reform that Zimmer – the chairwoman of the PDS between 2000 and
2003 – had hoped to do before the 2002 elections (Hough et al., 2007).
Conclusions
Parties that emerge as a result of a merging process between two or more parties are
faced with the challenge of developing a new ideological identity and programme with
which the different merging partners, their members and voters, can identify. This search
for a common programme between previously political ‘opponents’ is obviously more
difficult the larger the ideological differences between the merging parties.
In this case study, we have considered the position of the party Die Linke, founded in
2007, and its merging partners, the WASG and PDS, with respect to the economic left–
right policy issue. Using the Wordscores technique, our analysis reveals significant dif-
ferences in the positions of the PDS and theWASG on the old economic cleavage. In line
with our expectation, the content of the programme of their successor Die Linke is
clearly closer to the PDS than to the WASG. Given the longer ideological history of the
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PDS as well as its greater availability of resources, they seem to have had more influence
on the ideological profile of the newly formed party than the ‘little brother’ WASG. The
choice of Die Linke taking the position of the most leftist party clearly has implications for
the composition of the German party system, and, in particular, means that the SPD will
have a significant competitor on its left in future elections. Given the short history of Die
Linke it remains to be seen whether the electoral success of the 2005 elections will persist
in the future. For the first time in its history, the SPD has a potential durable partner on its
left flank which it will have to deal with (see also Hough et al., 2007). The SPD will have
to decide on the strategic dilemma – as have other European social democratic parties –
whether to position itself as a traditional left-wing party or in the political centre. This
choice will presumably be influenced by the finding that roughly a quarter of all voters
who supported DIE LINKSPARTEI.PDS in 2005 voted SPD in 2002 (Hough, 2005).
Similarly, the policy stance of the SPD might influence the programmatic choices of
Die Linke. This illustrates that although the Die Linke policy stance stems from the influ-
ence of its composing partners, it is also the result of influences outside the merged party,
such as policy positions of competing political parties and social and cultural change.
Indeed, a party does not act in a vacuum; its position is influenced by different social
and political changes and interactions. Even though a quantitative method of text anal-
ysis, such asWordscores, cannot capture these influences, we believe that this note offers
an interesting contribution to the empirical work on party programmes and illustrates the
usefulness of the novel technique of Wordscores. In applying this technique, we hope to
have contributed to its improvement, thereby increasing its scientific validity. Besides,
this study contributes to the study of political parties and party change. Even though
scholars in the field of party organization have recently been focusing on the phenomena
of party adaptation and party change, party mergers – that can be considered as an
extreme case of a party change – are under-studied at best (Mair, 1990). We believe
we have filled some of this gap by investigating one case of a party merger. Although
this offered the possibility to investigate and understand the dynamics present within
a single setting, a next interesting step would be a comprehensive study investigating and
comparing the ideological positioning of different merged parties and their respective
preceding political parties. A more comprehensive study could open the way for further
testing of our hypothesis, and might help us develop more ideas surrounding our hypoth-
esis on party mergers. Besides, future research might test where Die Linke will go and
how it will manage the heterogeneous demands put forward within the party. Our study
has shown where different fractions and tensions may occur. Indeed, the differing posi-
tions of the WASG and the PDS may articulate programmatic distinctions within
Die Linke and lead to bitter disputes if the party further elaborates its policy stance and
manifesto in the future.
Notes
1. In 2005, the PDS had 60,338 members in the Eastern la¨nder and 7,257 in the Western la¨nder
(see www.die-linke.de).
2. In 2005, over 80 percent of PDS members were older than 50 years of age; 64 percent of them
were older than 65 years.
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3. A detailed description of the Wordscores technique is provided in Laver et al. (2003). See also
http://wordscores.com for the Wordscores software. Our description of the method relies heav-
ily on Benoit et al. (2005: 299–300), Laver et al. (2006: 679–80) and Laver et al. (2003: 313).
4. The transformed score for text t was calculated using the following formula:




in which P refers to the raw score and A to the exogenous reference score,Amin and Amax being the
smallest and largest exogenous reference scores. Note that this transformation – as any transfor-
mation – does not reproduce the exogenous scores of all reference texts (Martin and Vanberg,
2008: 99).
5. Note that the manifesto was also used as the election programme for the 2005 Bundestag snap
elections. The party participated at these elections under the name DIE LINKSPARTEI.PDS
and some WASG people were put on the election lists.
6. We did an additional significance test for our three main programmes by calculating a straight-
forward z-score of the difference between the raw score means of two texts using the following
formula:




in which Px and Py refer to the raw score means of the economic position of texts x and y,
respectively, and SEx and SEy to the standard error of the raw score means of the economic posi-
tion of texts x and y, respectively. When this z-score is >1.96, it means that the difference
between the two means is significant (at the 95 percent confidence interval). This calculation
of a z-score is a more informative test for the significance of differences in mean scores than
looking at the 95 percent confidence intervals as presented earlier and as done in previous
Wordscores analyses (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2003; Laver et al., 2006). The conclusions based
on this additional test were similar to those based on the interval levels of confidence as pre-
sented in Table 2.
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